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Commentary on Family Planning Association Of Northern 
Ireland v The Minister For Health, Social Services And Public 
Safety 
 
SARA RAMSHAW 
 
 
Background to Judgment 
 
Northern Ireland (NI) is the only part of the United Kingdom that the Abortion Act 
1967 does not apply. As Karen Brennan explains: 
 
The law on abortion in Northern Ireland is governed by the relevant 
provisions of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 and the 
Criminal Justice (NI) Act 1945, and relevant case-law, including the 
English case of Bourne (1939) and more recent Northern Irish cases 
decided in the 1990s. The key legislative provision relating to abortion 
is section 58 of the 1861 Act which provides for the offence of 
‘unlawfully’ procuring a miscarriage. This section criminalises any 
person who intentionally and unlawfully procures the miscarriage of 
any woman, whether or not she is in fact pregnant; it similarly 
criminalises pregnant women who intentionally and unlawfully 
procure their own miscarriage. Anyone found guilty of an offence 
under section 58 is liable to the most severe penalty available in law: 
life imprisonment.1 
 
On 13 June 2001, leave was granted for a judicial review in the High Court of 
Northern Ireland by the Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland (fpaNI) 
against the Minister for Health concerning abortion law and the medical practices and 
provision of abortion services in NI. The fpaNI sought to secure clearer guidelines for 
women and practitioners in relation to the legality of abortion in the jurisdiction. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 K Brennan, ‘The State of Abortion Law in Northern Ireland’ in J Schweppe (ed), The Unborn Child, 
Article 40.3.3 and Abortion in Ireland: Twenty-Five Years of Protection? (Dublin, The Liffey Press, 
2008) 248-49. 
	    
hearing took place on 21 – 22 March 2002 and Kerr J (as he then was; he would later 
become Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and is presently The Right Honourable 
Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) 
gave judgment on 7 July 2003. As Kathryn McNeilly highlights in her feminist 
judgment, Kerr J rightly pointed out that abortion is legal in NI – in certain situations. 
However, Barbara Hewson remarks that, as a result of his judgment, the conditions 
for lawful abortion were defined much more restrictively than those applicable in 
other parts of the United Kingdom; ‘abortions for foetal abnormality (a service 
previously available in NI), or for rape or incest appear to be unlawful’.2  
The fpaNI appealed Kerr J’s ruling, which concluded that the Department of 
Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) did not fail in its statutory duty 
to: (a) issue advice and/or guidance to women and clinicians in NI on the availability 
and provision of termination of pregnancy services; or (b) to investigate whether 
women in NI are receiving satisfactory services in respect of actual or potential 
terminations of pregnancy in Northern Ireland; or (c) to make, or secure the making 
of, arrangements necessary to ensure that women in NI receive satisfactory services in 
respect of actual or potential terminations of pregnancy in NI. It is for this appeal that 
Kathryn McNeilly contributes her feminist judgment.  The other justices, namely 
Nicholson LJ, Campbell LJ and Sheil LJ, allowed the appeal and declaratory relief 
was granted, holding that guidelines must be provided.3 It is of note that McNeilly 
LJ’s is an additional, as opposed to a substitute, written judgment, which concurs with 
the other justices, but for other reasons. 	  
 
Further Legal Developments 
 
Five years (!) after the Court of Appeal decision, on 13 March 2009, the Northern 
Irish Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) published a 
document entitled, Guidance on the Termination of Pregnancy: The Law and Clinical 
Practice in Northern Ireland. This publication was later challenged in the High Court 
of Northern Ireland by the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Children, which is 
the subject of a feminist judgment by Claire McCann (with commentary by John 
Kennedy).4 In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children’s Application,5 Girvan 
LJ found in favour of the DHSSPS in respect to five of the seven grounds, namely 
that the Guidance had not misrepresented or misinterpreted the law on the termination 
of pregnancy in NI. However, it was held that those aspects of the publication dealing 
with counselling and conscientious objection failed to provide clear and accurate 
guidance and ordered the withdrawal of the DHSSPS Guidance with a view to being 
reconsidered. 
The DHSSPS then revised its Guidance in relation to those sections on 
counselling and conscientious objection and issued them for consultation, beginning 
27 June 2010 and ending on 22 October 2010. No revised Guidance resulted from this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 B Hewson, ‘The Law of Abortion in Northern Ireland’ (2004 Summer) Public Law 234, 235. 
 
3 For academic commentary on this appeal, see R Fletcher, ‘Abortion Needs or Abortion Rights? 
Claiming State Accountability for Women’s Reproductive Welfare: Family Planning Association of 
Northern Ireland v. Minister For Health, Social Services And Public Safety’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal 
Studies 123. 
4 See ch 23. 
5 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children’s Application [2009] NIQB 92. 
	    
consultation and the fpaNI brought a fresh legal challenge to force the Minister of 
Health to comply with the 2004 Court of Appeal order. The fpaNI was granted leave 
to apply for judicial review, with a full hearing, taking place in January 2013. In 
Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland’s Application,6 Treacy J acceded to 
the application and revised Guidance – The Limited Circumstances for a Lawful 
Termination of Pregnancy in Northern Ireland: A Guidance Document for Health and 
Social Care Professionals on Law and Clinical Practice – was considered by the NI 
Executive on 28 March 2013. Another public consultation was advised, and took 
place between 8 April – 29 July 2013.  
At this time, no new Guidance has been issued.  
 
 
Further Social/Cultural Developments 
 
In the years that followed the 2003 Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland, 
Re an Application for Judicial Review decision, there were many social and/or 
cultural developments, which have influenced the current political and legal climate 
surrounding abortion in Northern Ireland.  The most recent developments include: 
 
• The opening of the Marie Stopes Centre, NI’s first private abortion clinic, in 
Belfast in mid-October 2012.  
• The death of Savita Halappaananva in Galway, Ireland on 28 October 2012. 
• The latest guidance document, The Limited Circumstances for a Lawful 
Termination of Pregnancy in Northern Ireland: A Guidance Document for 
Health and Social Care Professionals on Law and Clinical Practice (2013), 
was highly criticised by feminist activists, e.g., from the Alliance For Choice 
(AFC) submission to the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW): ‘AFC expresses serious concerns about these 
guidelines including the language used which reinforces the criminalisation of 
women who seek abortion, the attempts to add restrictions beyond the scope of 
the current legal framework and further entrenchment of cultural views of 
women as mothers and reproducers.’ 
• In October 2013, senior health officials in NI consider cases of Sarah Ewart, 
and another woman known only as ‘Laura’, who were both forced to travel to 
England because foetal abnormality is not a ground for lawful termination in 
NI. 
• A consultation was conducted by the NI Department of Justice on the issue of 
abortion in instances of foetal abnormality and rape in NI (closing date of 17 
January 2015). The description from the Department of Justice website states: 
‘Firstly, [this consultation] looks at whether the law should enable abortion in 
cases where there is a diagnosis in pregnancy that the foetus has a lethal 
abnormality.  Secondly, it addresses the issue of whether abortion should be 
available to women who have become pregnant as a result of sexual crime.  It 
is not a debate on the wider issues of abortion law – issues often labelled as 
‘pro-choice’ and ‘pro-life’.’ 
• On 7 May 2014, the High Court in London held that NI women are not 
entitled to free NHS abortions in England. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland’s Application [2013] NIQB 1. 
	    
• On 23 September 2014, Jim Wells, who opposes abortion, even for victims of 
rape, is appointed Minister of Health in NI.  
• On 19 November 2014, anti-choice protester, Bernadette Smyth, is found 
guilty of harassing Dawn Purvis, then the Clinic Director of Marie Stopes 
Northern Ireland. 
• On 28 November 2014, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) calls 
for new law to move anti-choice protesters from the doorstep of its clinics. 
• On 2 February 2015, the Northern Irish Human Rights Commission was 
granted leave to pursue a judicial review of abortion law in Northern Ireland 
by the High Court in Belfast. 
• On 12 April 2015, the Department of Justice in NI recommends a change to 
NI’s abortion law, allowing for terminations in cases of fatal foetal 
abnormality. 
• On 27 April 2015, Jim Wells resigns as NI health minister over anti-gay 
remarks.  
• On 15 June 2015, an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission (NIHRC) for judicial review of the current abortion law in NI 
is heard in the Queen’s Bench Division, Belfast (see below for judgment). 
• On 26 June 2015, an open letter is sent to the NI public prosecution service, 
signed by 215 Northern Irish women, confessing to having either taken 
abortion pills themselves or having helped women procure them, which is 
illegal under NI’s abortion laws. The letter is in response to an ongoing court 
case, which began in Belfast on 19 June 2015, in which a mother, who cannot 
be named to protect the identity of her daughter, was charged with unlawfully 
procuring ‘poison’ (abortion pills Mifepristone and Misoprostol) for her 
daughter to have a miscarriage.  
• On 29 June 2015, Bernadette Smyth’s appeal is successful and her guilty 
verdict is quashed, the judge finding there was insufficient evidence that she 
harassed former Clinic Director of Marie Stopes NI, Dawn Purvis. 
• On 22 July 2015, a mother and her teenage daughter lost an appeal against the 
UK Government’s refusal to allow women in NI to have abortions on the 
NHS. The women are granted permission to appeal their case to the Supreme 
Court on 23 December 2015, which is scheduled to be heard in November 
2016.  
• On 30 November 2015, the High Court finds in favour of NIHRC, holding that 
the current abortion legislation in NI is incompatible with the UK’s 
obligations under the HRA 1998 in cases where women are pregnant and there 
is a fatal foetal abnormality or where the pregnancy is the result of rape and/or 
incest. A formal Declaration of Incompatibility is granted by Mr Justice 
Horner on 16 December 2015.  
• On 10 February 2016, a proposal in the NI Assembly to reform legislation and 
allow abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality (FFA) was defeated by 59 
votes to 40. The amendment to allow abortion in instances where a woman has 
become pregnant as a result of a sexual crime was voted down by 64 votes to 
32. Voting against the amendments, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
asked to Health Minister, Simon Hamilton, to set up a working group to 
examine issues raised by FFA. This working group, initially scheduled to be 
formed in February 2016 and due to report back in June 2016, was not formed 
until July 2016 (see below for further details). 
	    
• On 24 March 2016, the NI Executive releases Guidance for Health and Social 
Care Professionals on the Termination of Pregnancy in Northern 
Ireland. These guidelines do not take into consideration the ruling by the High 
Court that NI abortion laws are in breach of human rights. 
• On 4 April 2016, the first prosecution under the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 is taken against a 21-year old woman who received a suspended 
sentence over a self-induced abortion. 
• On 20 June 2016, an appeal against the ruling that abortion law in NI is 
‘incompatible’ with human rights law, jointly brought by the Department of 
Justice and NI Attorney General, John Larkin, begins in Belfast. The appeal 
lasted four days and judgment has been deferred. 
• On 14 July 2016, the working group on FFA has its first meeting, the Chair 
being the Chief Medical Officer, Michael McBride. The group is expected to 
report to the Justice Minister, Claire Sudgen, and the Health Minister, 
Michelle O’Neill, by the end of September 2016. 
 
 
Limitations of Legal Judgment 
 
In light of the limitations on the structure and content of legal judgment, including 
feminist judgment, this commentary will focus on some key theoretical issues that 
underlie McNeilly LJ’s decision.  
 
Indeterminacy of legal judgment 
 
In paragraphs 18-19 of her judgment, McNeilly LJ comments on the ‘ineradicable 
indeterminacy of the law’: 
 
An inherent indeterminacy exists within our common law tradition. 
Legal principles can never completely eradicate uncertainty and legal 
practice is never a straightforward application of legal rules in a fully 
predictable manner. This indeterminacy is what allows our common 
law adversarial system to operate, parties compete regarding the 
‘correct’ interpretation of a particular legal provision in a particular 
context. All law is indeterminate.  
 
This is a very brave assertion coming from a judge. Not least because it can be 
interpreted as undermining the very legitimacy of the law and, thus, that of the judges 
themselves tasked with enunciating its content. Purportedly, the very purpose of 
common law precedent or stare decisis – that is, the principle that like cases should be 
decided alike – is to ‘restrain the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise 
give judges’.7 Yet, McNeilly J, albeit daring in her addressing of the issue so openly 
and directly, is not really saying any more than what legal philosophers and theorists 
have been expressing for years. 8  Some more recent examples include Peter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 C Nelson, ‘Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 1, 
8. 
8 Legal indeterminacy, first articulated by American Legal Realists in the 1930s, is perhaps most well 
known as a critique made by prominent Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars, such as David Kennedy. 
However, as Gunther Teubner explains: ‘The critics vary in their analysis of legal indeterminacy. They 
ascribe indeterminacy of law to quite different complexes of causes: individual case decisions, legal 
	    
Fitzpatrick’s writings on the necessary ‘responsiveness’ of law in relation to its 
supposed determinate nature.9 I myself have extensively detailed the ‘fundamentally 
improvisational’ nature of law,10 which, put quite simply, is the necessary negotiation 
that takes place between the general (determinate) rules already in place and the 
singularity of the facts or case/question to be decided. As no two legal actions can be 
exactly the same, law can never completely void itself of indeterminacy and judges 
must improvise on the law already in place in every instance of legal judgment.11 This 
is not a controversial statement. However, by explicitly acknowledging the 
indeterminacy at the heart of legal judgment, McNeilly J opens up the possibility of 
more creative discussions of and solutions to the role of law in relation to women’s 
equality. 
 
Limitations/gendered nature of judicial review 
 
In Melina Buckley’s Author’s Note to her feminist judgment for the Women’s Court 
of Canada in Symes v Canada,12 she writes of the importance of judicial review to 
women’s equality: 
 
Constitutional review13 is one important, but by no means the only, 
avenue both for uncovering the structures of inequality as they 
manifest themselves in government actions, laws, and policies and for 
initiating steps towards the creation of equality. In this reconsideration 
of Symes, I highlight two features of transformative human rights 
practices in constitutional litigation: the need for judges to employ a 
substantive rather than an abstract conception of equality and the need 
to pay attention to the narrative and voices of women.14 
 
Despite Buckley’s optimism in relation to the possibility of such review, the issue as 
to whether judges, as opposed to legislatures, are better placed to ensure equality for 
and/or the advancement of women is extremely controversial and the question of 
whether there is ‘a distinctly feminist approach to theorising the legitimacy of judicial 
review’ is nowhere near settled.15 While there is not room in either this commentary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutions, the logic of legal argumentation, legal doctrine, social interests, or policies’: G Teubner, 
‘“And God laughed ...” Indeterminacy, self-reference and paradox in law’ (2011) 12 German Law 
Journal 376, 382. 
9 See, for example, P Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), and P Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London and New York, 
Routledge, 1992). 
10 S Ramshaw, Justice as Improvisation: The Law of the Extempore (London, Routledge, 2013) 4. 
11 S Ramshaw, ‘Deconstructin(g) Jazz Improvisation: Derrida and the Law of the Singular Event’ 
(2006) 2(1) Critical Studies in Improvisation 4. 
12 M Buckley, ‘Author’s Note. The Women’s Court of Canada: Symes v Canada’ (2006) 18(1) 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 27. 
13 Unlike Canada, under the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, primary legislation (Acts of 
Parliament) cannot be subject to judicial review, except in limited cases where the primary legislation 
is contrary to the laws of the European Union. For a recent critical study of the constitutional context of 
judicial review in the United Kingdom (under parliamentary sovereignty), see A Street, Judicial 
Review and the Rule of Law: Who’s in Control? (London, The Constitutional Society, 2013). 
14 Buckley, above n 12 at 28. 
15 This was an issue addressed at the Feminist Constitutional Theory Workshop at Edinburgh Law 
School on 28 May 2014. For more information, see http://www.legaltheorygroup.law.ed.ac.uk/spring-
workshops/programme/feminist-constitutional-theory/ (accessed 27 July 2015).  
	    
or McNeilly J’s judgment for a discussion of the advantages and/or limitations of 
judicial review in relation to women (especially in a jurisdiction such as NI, which 
still does not have even a female High Court judge, let alone a Court of Appeal one) it 
is an issue that feminist judgments have the potential to explore or address.16 
 
Power and limitations of the legal voice 
 
Over a quarter of a century ago, Lucinda Finlay wrote about the importance of 
thinking about the power and limitations of legal voice.  
 
Language, and the thoughts that it expresses, is socially constructed 
and socially constituting. Rather than being neutral or naturally 
ordained, it reflects the world views and chosen meanings of those 
who have had power to affect definitions and create terms. The 
selected terms and meanings then shape our understandings of what 
things are, of the way the world is. Careful attention to the language 
we use can reveal hidden but powerful assumptions framing the way 
people think about the world. The persistence of the language then 
entrenches the way of thinking that it expresses.17 
 
The power of legal language is evident in the terminology used by the relevant 
legislation in the fpiNI case, such as section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 
1861 and section 25 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945, which 
speak of the foetus as a ‘child’ or ‘unborn child’. Moreover, Kerr J’s judgment frames 
the issue in terms of ‘anti-abortion’ (para 15) instead of anti-choice. This seemingly 
neutral language actually reflects a particular world view, which already places a 
pregnant woman in a disadvantaged position in relation to personal autonomy and 
decision-making capacity. Moreover, it expresses and entrenches a preference for 
viewing the situation as one of protecting the foetus from harm as opposed to the 
pregnant woman’s right to choose. 
Attentive to the importance of language in relation to the law, in her judgment, 
McNeilly LJ is careful to place ‘concern for women’s lives at the centre of [the law]’ 
(para 34) and to emphasise that the ‘right to life includes protection from more than 
just deprivation of physical life itself. Increasingly the right is read as also relevant to 
the protection of the conditions which sustain life – social, economic and political 
conditions which enable a human being to thrive and live a viable life’ (para 34). This 
modification in focus and language directs attention back to women as decision-
makers and to the problems inherent in forcing determinations with insufficient 
information, as is the case with the law surrounding abortion in NI. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See, for example, Jo Bridgeman’s feminist judgment of R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex arte 
Glass: J Bridgeman, ‘R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex arte Glass’ in R Hunter, C McGlynn 
and E Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
Hart Publishing, 2010). According to Rosemary Hunter, Bridgeman’s feminist judgment identified ‘the 
incapacity of judicial review proceedings to regulate potential future conflicts, as opposed to 
adjudicating retrospectively on past events’: R Hunter, ‘Feminist judgments as a teaching resource’ 
(2012) 2(5) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 47. Available at 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/35676/1/OSLS%20article.pdf (last accessed 27 July 2015). 
17 L Finlay, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal 
Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886, 887. 
	    
Feminist Judgment – Difference it Might Have Made? 
 
While it is ultimately unclear how a feminist judgment would have influenced the 
legal, political and social landscape that followed the 2003 decision, it is beyond 
doubt that a feminist judgment would have shifted the focus of the debate to women 
as those who are most affected by the law and would have marked a significantly 
different framing of the issues, with feminist-informed guidelines possibly preventing 
additional litigation and (ongoing) disputes. Alternatively, a feminist judgment might 
have warned of and alerted others to the potential danger of calling for further 
guidance that would lead to a narrowing of the scope of legal abortion. This 
possibility, forecasted by feminists Fegan and Rebouche,18 is actually what happened 
in the draft documents to follow the 2004 appeal. The articulation of a feminist 
judgment in relation to the issue of abortion may have led to abortion being made 
legal in many more instances, if not all, in NI and Sarah Ewart, ‘Laura’, and countless 
unnamed others would have been saved the trauma and expense associated with 
travelling to England for abortions. Finally, a feminist judgment in this instance might 
have opened up discussion on the gendered nature of and potentially 
limited/widened/reframed the doctrine of judicial review in NI and the United 
Kingdom more generally. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 E Fegan and R Rebouche ‘Northern Ireland’s Abortion Law: The Morality of Silence and the 
Censure of Agency’ (2003) 11 Feminist Legal Studies 221, 235. 
	    
Family Planning Association of Northern  
Ireland v Minister for Health,  
Social Services and Public Safety  
(SPUC NI and others intervening) 
 
[2000] 432, [2001] NICA 37-39 
 
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION 
KERR J 
21, 22 MARCH, 7 JULY 2003 
 
COURT OF APPEAL 
NICHOLSON LJ, CAMPBELL LJ, SHEIL LJ AND McNEILLY LJ 
24-26 MAY, 8 OCTOBER 2004 
 
McNEILLY LJ. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
[1] Crisis or unplanned pregnancy is an issue which hundreds of women face 
and substantial numbers of medical practitioners and other health professionals come 
into contact with every year in Northern Ireland. It is undoubtedly very often a 
difficult, stressful and time-sensitive experience both for the woman and the range of 
professionals who are there to help, advise and support her. In such circumstances it is 
essential that both patients and professionals have prompt access to clear, accurate 
and complete information as to all the options which are potentially available, 
including lawful termination of pregnancy.  
[2] The appellant in this case, the Family Planning Association of Northern 
Ireland (‘fpaNI’), an organisation that provides a range of sexual health services, 
including assistance for women in such situations, is concerned that this is not always 
so in Northern Ireland. This case is an appeal to the decision of Kerr J (as he then 
was) in the Northern Ireland High Court to dismiss an application for judicial review 
of the alleged failure of the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety 
(‘the Department’) to fulfil its statutory duty under the Health and Personal Social 
Services (NI) Order 1972 (‘the 1972 Order’) and the common law principles of 
administrative law. The appellant alleges that the Department has unlawfully failed 
to: 
 
(a) issue advice and or guidance to women and clinicians in 
Northern Ireland on the availability and provision of termination of 
pregnancy services; or 
 
(b) to investigate whether women in Northern Ireland are receiving 
satisfactory services in respect of actual or potential terminations of 
pregnancy in Northern Ireland; or 
 
(c) to make, or secure the making of, arrangements necessary to 
ensure that women in Northern Ireland receive satisfactory services 
	    
in respect of actual or potential terminations of pregnancy in 
Northern Ireland.  
 
[3] The appellant sought a declaration from the High Court that the respondent 
had acted unlawfully in failing to fulfil its statutory duty in these three regards as well 
as an order of mandamus requiring the Minister to cure such unlawfulness. Kerr J 
dismissed the application based on the conclusion that, in his view, the law on 
termination of pregnancy in Northern Ireland is clear; no evidence could be found 
indicating significant uncertainty amongst medical professionals as to the law; nor 
that women who were entitled to lawful termination services in Northern Ireland were 
being denied them, leading there to be no need for the Department to investigate 
whether women were receiving satisfactory services. The declarations outlined above 
are still being sought by the appellant in the present appeal, although the order of 
mandamus is not.  
[4] While I cannot agree with all of his judgment, it is to be welcomed that 
Kerr J clearly affirmed that termination of pregnancy is legal in Northern Ireland in 
certain circumstances and that the law is somewhat difficult in its practical 
application. This in itself marks significant progress in dispelling myths on the legal 
status of abortion in Northern Ireland and moving towards dealing with the issues 
surrounding it in a more open and productive way. It is also important to note the 
necessary limitations of judicial review which judicial comment in this case must 
operate within. Judicial review is not intended to function as an appeal of the actions 
of a public body. It must remain focused on review of statutory duty and the legality 
of decision-making processes and outcomes as opposed to their merits (R v Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, ex parte Finlay [1983] 9 NIJB1; Re Glor Na nGael’s 
Application [1991] NI 117). In this respect, as has been noted by my learned 
colleagues, judgment in this case cannot compel any particular action from the 
Department nor speak to the wider issue of reform of abortion law in Northern 
Ireland. Although perhaps the questions raised in this case point towards the need to 
place the law in this area on a legislative footing, if not to overhaul it altogether. 
[5] My learned colleagues Nicholson LJ, Campbell LJ and Sheil LJ have 
delivered their judgments, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft. I intend 
to agree with their final conclusions that the appeal should be allowed, but wish to 
respectfully differ in reasoning in a number of respects which I will make clear 
presently. In particular, given the public interest imperatives which drive the doctrine 
of judicial review, I seek to return to, and ground my decision in, the experiences of 
those who are affected by the actions, or inactions, of the Department in question in 
this appeal. My learned colleagues are correct in their remarks that abortion is a 
sensitive and politically charged issue in Northern Ireland. However, it is my concern 
that in the judgments which have been made in this case attempts at a ‘neutral’ 
approach to the issue have had the effect of rendering invisible the experiences of 
women who are at the centre of the duties and services in question.  
 
THE DEPARTMENT’S STATUTORY DUTY 
[6] The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety is 
responsible for the provision of health services and personal social services in 
Northern Ireland. The respondent is the Minister for Health, Social Services and 
Public Safety, although given the recent reinstatement of Direct Rule, the Secretary of 
State will answer as the respondent in this appeal. The Health and Personal Social 
Services (NI) Order 1972 provides for the duties and powers of the Department. The 
	    
appellant has outlined Articles 4(a), 4(b), 7, 14 and 51 as they appear in Part II of the 
1972 Order as the provisions the Department is failing to lawfully comply with. The 
relevant extracts from these Articles provide as follows: 
 
General Duty of the Ministry 
 
4. It shall be the duty of the Ministry – 
 
(a) to provide or secure the provision of integrated health 
services in Northern Ireland designed to promote the physical 
and mental health of the people of Northern Ireland through 
the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness; 
(b) to provide or secure the provision of Personal Social Services 
in Northern Ireland designed to promote the welfare of 
people in Northern Ireland 
 
and the Ministry shall so discharge its duty as to secure the effective co-
ordination of Health and Personal Social Services.  
 
Prevention of Illness, Care and Aftercare 
 
7. –(1) The Ministry shall make arrangements, to such extent as it considers 
necessary, for the purposes of the prevention of illness, the care of persons 
suffering from illness, or the aftercare of such persons.  
 
Health Education 
 
14. The Ministry may disseminate, by whatever means it thinks fit, 
information relating to the promotion and maintenance of health and the 
prevention of illness.  
 
General Social Welfare 
 
15. –(1) In the exercise of its functions under Article 4(b) the Ministry shall 
make available advice, guidance and assistance, to such extent as it considers 
necessary and for that purpose shall make such arrangements and provide and 
secure the provision of such facilities… as it considers suitable and adequate.  
 
The appellants submit that the Department is also failing to comply with Article 51 
contained in Part V of the 1972 Order which provides: 
 
Powers of Ministry where services are inadequate 
 
51. If the Ministry is satisfied, after such investigation as it thinks fit, that any 
list prepared under this Order – 
 
(a) of medical practitioners undertaking to provide general 
medical services; or 
 
(b) …; or 
	    
 
(c) …; or 
 
(d) …; or 
 
(e) of persons undertaking to provide any other services; is not 
such as to secure the adequate provision of the services in 
question, or that for any other reason any considerable number 
of persons are not receiving satisfactory services under the 
arrangements in force under this Order the Ministry may 
authorise a Health and Social Services Board to make such other 
arrangements as the Ministry may approve, or may itself make 
such other arrangements as appears to the Ministry to be 
necessary.  
 
[7] It is submitted by Lord Lester on behalf of the appellant that ‘Article 4 
imposes a general duty on the respondent to secure the adequate provision of health 
and personal social services including termination of pregnancy services in Northern 
Ireland. Article 14 empowers the respondent to disseminate health information. 
Article 15 imposes a positive duty on the respondent, to such an extent as it considers 
necessary to make guidance available in the discharge of the general duty under 
Article 4(b). Article 51 empowers the respondent to make alternative arrangements 
where satisfied, after such investigation as he thinks fit, that services provided 
pursuant to the Order are inadequate or unsatisfactory.’ In addition, it is submitted 
that ‘the respondent cannot properly discharge the duties imposed on him by the 
Order or exercise the powers granted to him, unless he has sufficient knowledge and 
information as to whether an adequate service is in fact being provided in respect of 
terminations of pregnancy in Northern Ireland.’  
[8] In contrast, the respondent asserts that the Article 4 duty is a target duty 
which has ‘a degree of elasticity and allow[s] a considerable degree of tolerance to the 
public authority concerned in determining how the appropriate provision should be 
effected.’ In relation to Article 15 the respondent accepts that it does have power to 
publish and issue guidelines, but that there is no legal duty to do so and it does not 
‘believe that any purpose of sufficient value would or could be served by issuing 
guidance to practitioners on the law relating to termination of pregnancies in Northern 
Ireland.’ Article 51, in turn, is asserted as ‘no more than an aspect of the target duty 
imposed by Article 4(a).’ 
[9] It is not disputed by any party, nor was it questioned by Kerr J in the High 
Court, that the broad Article 4 ‘target duty’ (R v Inner London Education Authority, 
ex parte Ali (1990) 2 Admin LR 822) imposed upon the respondent covers the 
provision of services relating to the termination of pregnancy and attendance to the 
physical and mental health and well-being of women facing crisis or unplanned 
pregnancies. It is also accepted by the Department, as outlined above, that the issuing 
of guidelines to women and medical practitioners does potentially fall within the 
duties outlined in the 1972 Order. Mrs Maureen McCartney, a principal Civil Servant 
in the Department, has given details in her affidavit of when the Department has 
issued information and guidelines in other areas ‘where it has considered that some 
purpose of sufficient value to warrant publication would be served by doing so.’ What 
is disputed is, firstly, whether the law on abortion in Northern Ireland is sufficiently 
unclear as to compel the Department to issue guidelines and, secondly, whether 
	    
evidence exists to warrant investigation into whether women are receiving 
satisfactory services in relation to termination in Northern Ireland.  
 
CLARITY OF THE LAW RELATING TO ABORTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
[10] The law relating to abortion in Northern Ireland is contained in sections 
58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, section 25(1) of the Criminal 
Justice Act (NI) 1945 and a body of case law.  
 
Section 58 of the Act of 1861 states: 
  
Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her 
own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any 
poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any 
instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and 
whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any 
woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully 
administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other 
noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other 
means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of felony, 
and being convicted thereof shall be liable . . . 
  
Section 59 of the same Act provides: 
  
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or 
other noxious thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, 
knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or 
employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, 
whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable … 
  
Section 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945 provides: 
  
…Any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child 
incapable of being born alive, by any wilful act causes a child to 
die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall be 
guilty of felony, to wit, of child destruction, and shall be liable 
on conviction thereof on indictment to penal servitude for 
life.  Provided that no person shall be found guilty of an offence 
under this section unless it is proved that the act which caused 
the death of a child was no done in good faith for the purpose 
only of preserving the life of the mother. 
 
[11] My learned colleagues have examined in great detail the case law 
supplementing this legislative framework. Accordingly, I shall not dwell upon the 
details of this body of case law extensively. To provide a brief overview, R v Bourne 
[1939] 1 KB 687 is the leading case in this area. In this case MacNaughton J read the 
legislative proviso contained in section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 
(later mirrored in section 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945) that ‘a person 
shall not be guilty of an offence if acting in good faith to preserve the mother’s life’ as 
also relevant to section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act. The result was to 
	    
hold that a person who procures an abortion in good faith for the purposes of 
preserving the life of the mother – preventing her becoming a ‘physical or mental 
wreck’ – shall not be guilty of an offence. 
[12] The 1990s witnessed a spate of case law engaging the interpretation of 
this provision. To plot the significant points of this body of case law, in Northern 
Health and Social Services Board v F and G [1993] NI 268 preserving the life and 
health of the woman was read as encompassing both her physical and mental health 
and well-being. This case involved a minor whose mental well-being necessitated a 
termination. In this case even though the termination was determined as lawful the 
minor was still required to travel to England for the procedure due to what Sheil J (as 
he then was) described in his judgment as ‘the reluctance of obstetricians in 
Northern Ireland to carry out the operation.’ The case of Northern Health and Social 
Services Board v A and Others [1994] NIJBI, which involved a mentally handicapped 
woman pregnant as a result of rape, interpreted preserving the life of the woman to 
entail avoiding an adverse effect which is ‘real and serious.’ This was further 
elaborated in Western Health and Social Services Board v CMB and the Official 
Solicitor [1995] (unreported), a case involving a mentally handicapped minor, to be 
‘permanent or at least long-term.’  
[13] From this legislative and common law framework, a statement of the law 
appears to be that termination is permitted where there is a serious and long-term risk 
to the woman’s mental or physical health or well-being. However, while legal 
practitioners may find clarity in this statement and how it should be applied, the 
appellant’s case raises concerns that much uncertainty greets women and medical 
practitioners not fortunate enough to possess years of legal experience and 
knowledge. Kerr J in his judgment spent much time considering the distinction 
between what the law is and its practical application. His conclusion was that ‘the 
legal principles are… clear and easily absorbed. It might well be difficult in some 
circumstances to decide whether the facts of an individual case can be accommodated 
within the principles as outlined but this is not due to a lack of clarity in the principles 
themselves.’ The law, for Kerr J, is not unclear but merely difficult to apply and these 
difficulties are matters of clinical judgment which the issuing of guidelines could do 
nothing to alleviate. I wish to make three comments on this issue, the first two relating 
to medical professionals’ understanding and application of the law, the third relating 
to the certainty of the law itself. 
[14] Firstly, like my learned colleagues Nicholson LJ, Campbell LJ and Sheil 
LJ, I am also unconvinced, following evidence submitted by a range of medical 
professionals, that there exists no uncertainty as to what the law in this area is. An 
understanding of what the law is must be a prerequisite for the exercise of clinical 
discretion as to application of the law. Dr James Dornan, Director of Fetal Medicine 
at the Royal Jubilee Maternity Hospital, pointed in his affidavit towards uncertainty 
amongst himself and his colleagues as to the legal position of termination in cases of 
foetal abnormality. It is highly significant that in 2001 Dr Dornan wrote to the 
Department requesting guidance. I cannot accept, as Kerr J did, that the Department’s 
response of referring Dr Dornan to Mrs McCartney’s affidavit submitted to the High 
Court in the present case constitutes adequate guidance as to the current legal 
framework governing this area. Ms Breedagh Hughes, the Northern Ireland Board 
Secretary of the Royal College of Midwives, also expressed concern in her affidavit 
regarding the absence of guidance for midwives as to their role in termination 
procedures. Not only does this suggest that lack of open and readily accessible 
guidance on the law is making the role of professionals difficult, but it is also placing 
	    
practitioners and ancillary staff in the very serious position of potential criminal 
liability, a potentiality which will no doubt impact upon their readiness to provide 
such services. While Kerr J appeared to dismiss such evidence, I do not find it 
possible to do so.  
[15] Secondly, even if there was clear evidence of consensus as to what the 
law is, I do not feel that the issue would be fully resolved. In this regard it is worth 
spending some time considering Kerr J’s comments. While his distinction between 
what the law is and how it is applied is no doubt accurate, and a chasm which women 
have indeed struggled with for decades, I do not feel that it can be used to justify 
inaction in this case. Not only does it sit uncomfortably for judicial comment to state 
what the law is and then abandon all responsibility for its practical application, 
deeming it a matter of clinical judgment for non-legal professionals, but this 
distinction leads to problematic outcomes when we return to the experiences of 
women. Declaring application of the law to be entirely within the domain of medicine 
further solidifies the power and legitimacy of the medical profession to make 
decisions about the lives of women. In contrast, the issuing of guidelines making the 
legal framework and women’s position under it explicit would enhance the position of 
women to access information and make decisions concerning their own reproductive 
capacity. This is particularly important in a context where, as the appellant has 
submitted, conservative attitudes are prevalent amongst the still male-dominated 
medical profession in Northern Ireland, especially in rural areas, a point I will return 
to later. Guidance in this respect would enhance not only the understanding of 
medical practitioners but also the ability of women to access coherent information 
about termination and its legal availability.  
[16] Thus, I follow my colleagues in this court in respectfully disagreeing with 
Kerr J’s decision that no relevant uncertainty exists amongst the medical community 
as to what the law is. I also agree that the issuing of guidance would not, as the 
Department suggests, merely serve to ‘summarise the law relating to abortion as 
explained by the High Court.’ As my colleagues have highlighted, questions of 
aftercare, the rights and roles of ancillary staff and issues such as clarifying how a 
referral for a termination is made and where such services are provided would also be 
of great benefit to women and professionals. Evidence suggests this information is at 
the least difficult to access, if not completely unavailable. However, a distinction must 
be drawn between my reasoning here and that of my colleagues, Nicholson LJ in 
particular. While throughout his judgment the learned judge advances the utility of 
guidelines for both medical practitioners and women, I find problematic his view that 
‘it would be wrong to give that guidance to pregnant women unless they request it or 
in the opinion of the medical profession need it. Otherwise it could be regarded as an 
encouragement to seek abortion.’ Of course, if a patient expresses that a pregnancy is 
planned there will usually be no need to consider the option of lawful termination, but 
I must express concern with the paternalistic sentiment which I fear underpins this 
comment, if unconsciously, climaxing in his concluding comment that ‘this judgment 
is written in the hope that the department will seek to… encourage those seeking an 
abortion in Northern Ireland to make a different choice.’  
[17] Just as it is not the position of the court to take the decision of a public 
body in these proceedings, so too the court has no jurisdiction in advocating, or 
seeking to dissuade women from taking, a particular course of action. The concern 
here is whether medical professionals and women can be aided in deciding whether a 
termination may be lawful in particular circumstances, not reducing the number of 
lawful terminations which are carried out. Basing a perception that a need for 
	    
guidance exists on paternalistic concerns such as the need to ensure women know 
they are consenting to a procedure that ‘can have damaging effects on the physical 
and mental health of the mother’ (Nicholson LJ) or to ‘protect the interests of the 
unborn child’ (Sheil LJ) muddies the water of the crux of this case – that evidence 
suggests guidance may be needed to make the law clearer to those who use it.  
[18] A further distinction must be made between my reasoning and that of my 
learned colleagues on the third point which I wish to discuss; whether the law itself is 
clear in this area. Much consideration has been dedicated to the summary of the law 
proposed by Mr Hanna for the respondent and approved by Lord Lester for the 
appellant. Kerr J and Sheil LJ accepted this summary as a clear statement of the law, 
while Nicholson LJ rejected the summary mainly because the principles ‘are not 
expressed in language appropriate to a criminal trial which is what the medical 
practitioner would be facing.’ Nicholson LJ then goes on to highlight a number of 
indeterminacies which the principles contain. I agree that Mr Hanna’s summary does 
indeed contain such indeterminacies. However, I must disagree with the frame of 
illegality which Nicholson LJ’s comments place abortion within, further solidifying 
myths regarding the legality of abortion in Northern Ireland. 
[19] I also believe that debate surrounding this summary of the law veils a 
more fundamental issue that the judiciary and all working with the practical 
application of the law need to embrace – the ineradicable indeterminacy of the law. 
An inherent indeterminacy exists within our common law tradition. Legal principles 
can never completely eradicate uncertainty and legal practice is never a 
straightforward application of legal rules in a fully predictable manner. This 
indeterminacy is what allows our common law adversarial system to operate; parties 
compete regarding the ‘correct’ interpretation of a particular legal provision in a 
particular context. All law is indeterminate. The law relating to termination of 
pregnancy in Northern Ireland is indeterminate. This fact is added to by the somewhat 
ad hoc way in which the law has developed and the sensitivity of the issues involved 
which has led to a general reluctance to deal with this topic openly and substantively. 
In an area of law so frequently engaged by non-legal practitioners, guidance would 
undoubtedly be of use in helping to work through the particular indeterminacy of law 
in this area. Judicial declarations of clarity or technical fumbling will not be of use to 
those who need to work with the law in every day, time-sensitive situations. Thus, the 
best option appears to be to accept the inherent indeterminacy of law and seek to 
establish mechanisms, such as guidance, which make the law as accessible and 
workable as possible.   
 
INVESTIGATION 
[20] The second question in this appeal is whether the Department failed to 
comply with its statutory duty under Article 4 of the 1972 Order in refraining from 
carrying out investigation as to whether women are receiving satisfactory services in 
respect of actual or potential terminations of pregnancy. It is not disputed that no 
investigation has been undertaken by the Department in relation to the extent and 
nature of termination services being provided. Mr Hanna for the respondent asserts 
that there is no evidence that any woman has been deterred from having a lawful 
termination performed in Northern Ireland and that the appellant’s case is based on 
mere assertions by an interest group. Furthermore, the Department asserts that there is 
no need to carry out investigation into the extent and nature of termination services 
because ‘all lawful termination will be provided, if required, under the Health and 
Personal Social Services.’ The appellant argues, in contrast, that the Department 
	    
cannot effectively discharge the duties imposed on it unless it is informed of the 
adequacy of the services currently being provided.  
[21] In Kerr J’s view, since the law is clear ‘there is no evidence to suggest 
that there is any lack of “satisfactory services” and the case for investigation falls 
away.’ His analysis of this aspect of the appellant’s case, therefore, was restricted. 
Having rejected that the law, and understanding of the law, is as clear as Kerr J 
proposed it to be, it is necessary to spend some time considering the issues 
surrounding investigation. Kerr J appears to suggest that because there is no evidence 
of unsatisfactory service provision in this area no investigation is warranted. In my 
view, however, positive evidence of satisfactory service provision should be required 
to successfully argue that no investigation is warranted. Otherwise the Department is 
permitted to rely on its own lack of investigation to justify that there is no need for 
investigation. It is here, on the question of investigation, that the Department has a 
chance to centre its work on the experiences of women as its service users. 
[22] I concur with Nicholson LJ that from the 1993 case of Northern Health 
and Social Services Board v F and G [1993] NI 268 highlighted above the 
Department should have been alerted to the fact that there may be a number of women 
entitled to abortion services who are unable to access them in Northern Ireland. On 
the contrary, the Department appears to have closed its ears to case law developments 
and has demonstrated a sustained lack of information collection on abortion services, 
for example, the grounds on which lawful terminations are carried out. Similarly, the 
Department was also aware of Dr Colin Francome’s 1994 study which found that 
11% of Northern Ireland GPs had treated patients suffering from the consequences of 
amateur abortions. The current legal framework governing termination of pregnancy 
in Northern Ireland combined with the costly alternative option of travelling to Britain 
to obtain a lawful termination unfortunately makes it more likely that women may be 
at risk from ‘backstreet abortion’ operators. The seriousness of this situation 
combined with the Department’s awareness of research relating to it raises further 
questions as to why no investigation into whether women are receiving satisfactory 
services in respect of actual or potential terminations of pregnancy in Northern 
Ireland has been carried out. 
[23] The vacuum of quantitative data on termination service provision in 
Northern Ireland is not the only issue relevant to the question of investigation. In his 
judgment Kerr J also notes – although dismisses – a significant point advanced by the 
appellant which, keeping the experiences of women central, warrants consideration. 
This point relates to the imbrication of socio-cultural values and the practical working 
of law on abortion. Every judgment in this case has acknowledged the particularly 
conservative social and religious context of Northern Ireland and the impact this has 
had in rendering abortion, to say the least, a ‘sensitive’ issue. As part of this context 
views on gender, reproduction and family life in Northern Ireland have maintained 
traditional perspectives on women and motherhood. In my view, the present case 
must be placed in this context and these issues also point towards a role for the 
Department in investigation.  
[24] Mr Hanna on behalf of the respondent raises the concern that the number 
of health professionals who object to abortion on moral and/or religious grounds may 
be higher in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the UK. It is quite possible that local 
socio-cultural attitudes combined with discomfort, uncertainty and misinformation 
surrounding the law governing abortion may influence application of the law in 
cautious, conservative ways. Perhaps even in ways which deny access to termination 
services when such would fall within the law. I regret that I cannot accept Kerr J’s 
	    
conclusion that the current vacuum of evidence regarding such practices, combined 
with medical practitioners general duty to make sure his/her personal beliefs do not 
prejudice patients’ care, is enough to confirm that such imbrication between law and 
socio-cultural views does not exist or is not impacting application of the law in this 
area. FpaNI is an organisation who for over two decades has been working with 
women facing unplanned or crisis pregnancies and has had significant contact with 
medical practitioners and other health professionals in this area. Given this experience 
I believe it would be wrong to merely dismiss their concerns as entirely unfounded, 
and would suggest that such concerns again may indicate the need for thorough 
investigation by the Department as to the extent and nature of services being provided 
to women. 
[25] It is also concerning that, as Ms Audrey Simpson of fpaNI asserts in her 
affidavit, there is currently only one hospital in Belfast which carries out most 
terminations in Northern Ireland. This assertion remains unchallenged and 
unexplained by the Department and suggests an unsatisfactory spread of service 
provision across the province, given that termination of pregnancy is generally not a 
complex or highly specialised procedure. It is essential that women receive parity of 
access to impartial information and services wherever they live. The concentration of 
abortion provision in Belfast raises serious concerns about how widespread the 
service provision the Department offers currently is. I would also suggest that this 
information is gathered with attention to the particular socio-cultural context of 
Northern Ireland and the Department is assured that conservative and religious 
approaches to gender and reproduction, particularly in more rural areas outside 
Belfast, are not hindering fulfilment of its statutory duty under Article 4 of the 1972 
Order. 
[26] Informing itself of the situation in respect to services it is providing, or 
potentially providing, without doubt forms part of the target duty laid down for the 
Department in Article 4 of the 1972 Order. The Department appears to have fallen 
down in this duty by taking too few steps to inform itself of the adequacy, or 
otherwise, of services being provided to women across Northern Ireland. The 
Department’s establishment of a working group to consider whether the issuing of 
guidance is necessary is a welcome move which, perhaps, could be accompanied by 
the setting up of an investigative committee to inform both the provision of services 
in relation to termination of pregnancy and consideration of whether, and on what 
issues, guidance is required.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
[27] Lord Lester for the appellant argues that the Department, as a public 
authority, has a duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 not to act in a 
way which is incompatible with rights under the European Convention of Human 
Rights. It is submitted that the court is under the same section 6 duty and, moreover, 
section 3 of the same Act reinforces this duty by outlining a need to read and give 
effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with 
Convention rights. Thus, the appellant asserts that Convention rights, and their 
domestic enshrinement in the Human Rights Act, are fundamental to the 
Department’s fulfilment of its duties under the 1972 Order and the court’s 
interpretation of it. The particular rights which are alleged as in violation by the 
Department’s current position are Article 2, the right to life, and Article 8, the right to 
private and family life.  
	    
[28] Kerr J in his judgment and my learned colleagues in this court are of the 
opinion that human rights in no way assist the appellant’s case. Where an application 
for judicial review is made wholly or, as in the present case, partly with reference to 
human rights the applicant must satisfy the test laid out in section 7 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. This test mirrors the test for standing before the European Court of 
Human Rights provided in Article 34 of the Convention and requires that the 
applicant is a victim of the alleged human rights violation in question. The appellant 
does not argue that it fulfils such a test, but makes a rights-based argument under the 
Human Rights Act nonetheless. The question appears to be whether the court can or 
must consider the 1972 Order and the Department’s actions/inactions through the lens 
of human rights nevertheless. I regret that I cannot so easily agree with the view of 
my learned colleagues in answering this question in the negative.   
[29] The case law surrounding Article 34 of the Convention and section 7 of 
the Human Rights Act has indeed been quite restrictive. In relation to the former, Kerr 
J and Nicholson LJ rightly cite the authority of Klass and others v Germany [1978] 2 
EHRR 214 where it was affirmed that an applicant should claim to have been actually 
affected by the violation in question, rejecting that individuals could complain against 
a law in abstracto or in a kind of actio poplarius. However, it is important to note that 
some case law in the European Court of Human Rights does appear to suggest that 
abstract review of state action/inaction is possible. For example, Open Door and 
Dublin Well Women (1992) 15 EHRR 244, Kjeldsen, Busk and Madsen v Denmark 
(1980) 1 EHRR 711 and Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (1977) 3 EHRR 244 
point towards a wider interpretation of the Article 34 rule. Domestic case law under 
the Human Rights Act has also generally taken a strict approach to section 7 standing, 
although here too the recent case of R (Rusbrudger) v Attorney General [2003] UKHL 
38 took a wider approach.  
[30] On first blush, it appears that at both the domestic and European level 
only by relying on reasonably obscure case law can the appellant be considered to 
have standing to make human rights arguments. However, I believe it is relevant that 
while not a victim in the strict sense, the appellant dedicates significant amounts of 
time and resources to advising women and health professionals on the remit of 
termination services in Northern Ireland. There is a close imbrication between the 
interests of the women the appellant alleges are facing potential rights violations and 
the work that the appellant carries out. The lack of guidance in this area is also 
hindering the appellant from carrying out its work in the most effective and expedient 
manner. These facts lead me to conclude that the human rights argument made by the 
appellant is relevant to review in this case.  
[31] In addition, there is an increasing importance of human rights in the UK 
legal system which obliges courts to place their work within a broader human rights 
frame. This is surely what the duty outlined in section 3 reflects. This increasing 
importance of human rights appears to me to be particularly important in cases of 
judicial review. While the section 7 test remains in place, the close relationship 
between human rights and the public interest, the latter forming the epicentre of the 
doctrine of judicial review, surely means that human rights concerns can no longer be 
swiftly dismissed in cases such as the present, even if only considered obiter. Thus, in 
carrying out the function of reviewing public power and the performance of public 
duties it would be amiss in the contemporary legal landscape for the court to ignore 
the wider human rights context which its powers of review are located within. I fear 
that in dismissing any human rights argument as relevant in the present case my 
	    
learned colleagues may have taken a rather restrictive approach to the contemporary 
doctrine of judicial review and its relation to human rights concerns.  
[32] With this in mind, attention should be paid to the appellant’s assertion 
that the current position in relation to services for the termination of pregnancy in 
Northern Ireland impacts women’s enjoyment of human rights. In particular, Article 2 
of the Convention appears to have important resonances. I am not asserting that this is 
the only right which is relevant. Article 2 does, however, powerfully illustrate how 
attention to rights may shed further light on the issues raised in this case. This Article 
provides that: 
 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence 
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty 
is provided by law.  
 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force 
which is no more than absolutely necessary:  
(a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence;  
(b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained;  
(c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.  
 
[33] Evidence presented to this court raises concern that practice surrounding 
the provision of termination services in Northern Ireland may be leading to potential 
violations of this Article which the Department should be attentive to. Evidence from 
medical practitioners that there is uncertainty, or at least a lack of clarity, amongst 
professionals as to when abortion may be lawfully carried out in Northern Ireland 
indicates that women’s physical lives may be placed at risk unnecessarily by lawful 
termination which is refused or delayed. This refusal or delay may also lead women to 
turn to illegal ‘backstreet’ abortion providers, further risking their lives and physical 
well-being. Anxiety surrounding possible criminal prosecution which may lead 
practitioners to apply the law conservatively could, as I have suggested above, be 
aided by the issuing of guidelines leading, in turn, to a more robust protection under 
Article 2 for women experiencing unplanned or crisis pregnancy.  
[34] In addition, however, placing concern for women’s lives at the centre of 
statutory duties in relation to lawful services for the termination of pregnancy 
involves more. The right to life includes protection from more than just deprivation of 
physical life. Increasingly the right is read as also relevant to the protection of the 
conditions which sustain life – social, economic and political conditions which enable 
a human being to thrive and live a viable life. In this sense further concerns are raised 
as to the Department’s current inaction under the 1972 Order. This approach to 
Article 2 suggests the need for action to ensure, for example, effective aftercare 
services for all women resident in Northern Ireland who undergo termination, whether 
in Northern Ireland or elsewhere. It also suggests a role for investigation into 
women’s experiences of termination services. Are current arrangements across the 
province sufficient to ensure women’s lives are being promoted and protected in the 
widest possible sense? The statutory duties imposed on the Department read in this 
way require it to attend to the conditions under its control which make the lives of 
	    
women who face crisis or unplanned pregnancies viable, flourishing, or otherwise. 
While this is a reading which may appear prima facia unorthodox, it suggests what an 
approach which values and takes seriously the lives of women may look like.  
[35] It is also significant to note that Article 2 is a non-derogable right; it 
cannot be withdrawn or compromised in any circumstance. In the case of Bugdaycay 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514 it was held that where 
non-derogable rights are at issue in a case of judicial review, as I have argued Article 
2 is in the present case, ‘anxious scrutiny’ of the powers and decision-making in 
question should be undertaken. In light of this, I must respectfully disagree with my 
learned colleagues and take the Article 2 concerns raised by the current case very 
seriously. Article 2 is relevant to review of the Department’s action/inaction under the 
1972 Order and indeed strengthens the need for a reassessment of its current position 
in relation to the issues raised in this appeal.  
 
CONCLUSION 
[36] From the above I conclude that the appeal should be allowed and the 
appropriate declarations made. I reiterate that this conclusion is not directing the 
Department to issue guidelines on the law governing abortion in Northern Ireland. 
Such a direction would overstep the function of review and make decisions reserved 
for elective representatives. What this conclusion is directing, however, is that the 
Department look again at issues such as clarity about and application of the law 
amongst medical professionals, availability of information on lawful termination for 
women facing crisis or unplanned pregnancies, and at the considerable gaps in its own 
knowledge as to the termination services that are, or are not, currently being provided 
on the ground.  
[37] Kerr J is no doubt correct in his assessment that the issuing of guidance, 
if the Department does come to this conclusion, is not the answer to all the problems 
in this area of law nor to all the problems experienced by women facing crisis or 
unplanned pregnancies in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, some of the difficulties 
encountered by women and professionals may be alleviated by taking action such as 
issuing guidance and investigating the nuances of current service provision. This must 
begin by placing the needs and experiences of those most directly affected by this 
issue at the heart of the Department’s actions. While this case cannot speak to the 
wider state of the law governing termination of pregnancy in Northern Ireland, it can 
ensure that the Department is approaching its statutory duties with a mind-set which is 
committed to providing the best possible service and the most complete information 
within the current law for those who need it. 
 	  	  
 
